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Summary findings
In this exploration of urban and regional dynamics in  employment abroad. This may reduce pressure on the
Poland after the transition, Deichmann and Henderson  Polish labor market but also keeps dynamic actors out of
find that the degree of urbanization and primacy remains  the domestic labor force, reducing growth in urban
low in Poland. The largest cities are not growing at the  businesses and industry.
rate that would be expected if post-transition  Employment in manufacturing and agriculture is
adjustments were operating freely. As a result, Poland is  relatively concentrated, but specialization seems to have
not fully realizing external economies from urban  declined in recent years, perhaps reflecting barriers to
agglomeration.  labor mobility-which  could limit growth.
Internal migration decreased significantly in the 1990s,  That employment in the manufacturing sector is quite
with rural-to-urban  migration declining dramatically.  concentrated is to be expected in a formerly planned
Current population levels everywhere seem frozen at a  economy. But employment in the service sector is also
degree of urbanization that is low by international  quite concentrated. A geographic divergence of service
standards. Migration levels do not respond to  activities is not explained by dominant growth in
unemployment differentials, perhaps because Poland's  specialized financial and business services in the capital
continuing housing shortage deters migration. Housing  alone.
construction, which was already low, fell by half in the  Poland's policymakers should find a way to provide
1990s and has only recently begun a slight recovery.  housing, thereby reducing barriers to labor mobility and
A significant number of mostly young and educated  growth.
temporary migrants leave Poland annually, many to find
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This paper consists of three short, self-contained research notes on various aspects of urban and regional
economic development in Poland. This material was compiled at the request of the Europe and Central
Asia Department of the World Bank. The three topics we discuss are urban population agglomeration and
population mobility, economic sector transformation and growth, and demographic patterns.
Although changes in statistical data collection after the transition from  socialism make the  analysis of
post-transition  economic  trends  difficult,  our  analysis  has  identified  a  number  of  interesting
developments. The degree of urbanization and primacy in Poland remains low. The largest cities are not
growing at a rate that would be expected if post-transition adjustment processes were operating freely. A
consequence may be that  external economies due to urban  agglomeration are not fully realized  in the
Polish economy.
Trends in migration confirm this finding. Internal migration has decreased significantly in the 1990s with
rural-to-urban  migration  showing  the  most  dramatic  decline.  Overall  population  trends  indicate  that
current population levels in urban and rural areas seem almost frozen at a degree of urbanization that is
low by international comparison. Migration levels also do not appear to respond to large unemployment
differentials across  small  geographic  areas.  One explanation  for  these  trends  may  be the  continuing
housing  shortage  in  Poland, which  may  deter  potential  migrants.  From  already  low  levels,  housing
construction had fallen by more than fifty percent during the  1990s and has only recently begun a slight
recovery.
While internal migration as well as permanent international migration are quite low, a significant number
of mostly young and  educated temporary migrants  leave Poland annually-many  to find employment
abroad. This may reduce pressure on the Polish  labor market, but it may also  keep some of the more
dynamic  actors out of the  domestic  labor force, thus reducing growth in urban  based  businesses and
industry.
Employment in manufacturing and  agricultural activities  is relatively  concentrated in Poland. There is
some indication of regional convergence in the manufacturing sector. However, this trend does not appear
to be leading to voivod specialization. In fact specialization appears to have declined in recent years. This
may be a further reflection of barriers to labor mobility. Significant growth potential may be unrealized, if
specialized workers do not relocate to areas where their skills are in demand by a concentrated cluster of
similar industries.
While geographic concentration of the manufacturing sector is to be expected-especially  in a formerly
planned economy-service  sector employment is also quite  concentrated. Furthermore, there  appears to
be further geographic divergence of service activities. This trend seems to be general across services and
is thus not explained by dominant  growth in specialized  financial and  business services in the  capital
alone. Divergence in growth of any activity across regions, especially for services which are most non-
traded across regions, is very unusual and is unlikely to persist far into the future.
This study  provides a  reconnaissance view of urban and  regional  dynamics in post-transition  Poland.
Although  it is not possible to provide  conclusive  answers to many  of the policy  questions, we  have
identified a  number  of issues  that  would  deserve  closer  investigation.  The  most  important  issue  is
probably to  identify the major barriers to  labor mobility,  in particular the  role of the housing market.
Given that a decreasing average household size will increase demand for new dwelling units further, even
with  stable  population trends,  housing  provision  may  be one  of the  primary  policy  questions  facing
Poland in the near future.
2Data sources
Unless otherwise indicated, all data sets used in this study came from the Polish Central Statistical Office
(Glowny Urzad Statystyczny,  GUS, www.stat.gov.pl) in Warsaw  either as hardcopy publications  or in
digital format. A list of the statistical publications used for this study is included in the bibliography.
Maps
Although Poland has recently changed its administrative structure and has reduced the number of voivods
from 49 to  16, statistical information over time is available only for the old set of regions. These have
been used throughout in our statistical analysis and to display economic and social variables. To keep the
maps  simple,  we  have  added  only  limited  annotation. The  appendix  contains  a  reference  map  that
indicates the voivod names.
31.  Urban  population  agglomeration  and population  mobility
Introduction and summary
This note examines aspects of urban agglomeration and population mobility in Poland. Like other ECA
countries, Poland started the transition with unusual features compared to many countries. The effect of
the transition  on these  features and  some disturbing developments since transition are  discussed. Key
findings are:
1)  Poland has a low degree of urban concentration. The primate urban area size is small and there is a
quick drop-off in city sizes moving down the urban hierarchy. This suggests that urban agglomeration
economies are not fully  exploited, with attendant growth losses. In the case of Poland the growth
losses are estimated to be 3/4 of a growth point a year.
2)  As is common, the ranking by size of cities in the top echelon has not changed since 1950, but there
has been lots of upward and downward mobility in city size rankings below the top echelon. In the
1970's and 1980's there was some catch-up where smaller cities as a group grew more quickly than
bigger cities, but that trend stopped in the 1990's.
3)  Migration in Poland, whether urban-urban, rural-rural, or rural-urban, has dropped dramatically since
transition.  This  drop  appears  to  be  tied  to  tightness  in  the  housing  supply, induced  by  poorly
functioning  housing  markets.  Poland's  already  low rates  of housing  completions  and  residential
housing investment have dropped to very low levels since transition.
4)  While  permanent international migration, which has  been very significant  in Poland's history, has
declined considerably, temporary labor migration  mostly to  Western Europe is quite  considerable.
This temporary labor migration  may act  as a  "safety valve",  reducing pressure on  the local labor
markets and it may also lessen the need for rural workers to move to urban jobs. However, the large
number  of  temporary  workers  also  means  that  a  large  pool  of  skilled  workers  is  potentially
unavailable in dynamically growing domestic sectors.
Agglomeration and mobility
In  this  section,  we  look  at  the  extent  of  urban  agglomeration  in  Poland  and  how  the  extent  of
agglomeration has changed over time. The concern is whether Poland is under-agglomerated and whether
transition is helping that process.
The Extent  of Agglomeration.
The extent of urban concentration in ECA countries is modest compared to other countries in the world.
The simplest measure of urban concentration is primacy - the fraction of the national urban population
living in the largest metro/urban area. Based on  the urban agglomeration  of Katowice (3.4m  people),
Poland's primacy is 0.14, compared to an international average of 0.31. Primacy does vary in a consistent
fashion with country size, income and openness to trade. Controlling for these features, Box 1 indicates
that ECA countries overall have a primacy value that is less than expected by 0.13. Poland's primacy in
1995 is 0.066 less than expected, a deficit that has increased in recent years with the stagnation of the
population size of Poland's larger metro areas. Moreover Katowice is an unusual metro area with a small
central municipality ( 1/1 Oth of the urban area population). If Warsaw at a population of 2.2 million were
used for the primacy measure, Poland's under-concentration would look even greater.
4Box  1: Amount Primacy Differs From its Expected Magnitude by Region
(Mean primacy = 0.31)
(1)  (2)
Asia  -.039  Poland  1975  -.021
Sub-Saharan  Africa  -.016  1980  -.036
Eastern  Europe-Central  Asia  -.133  1985  -.043
North  Africa Middle  East  -.053  1990  -.045
Latin  American  .042  1995  -.066
The coefficients  are from an analysis  of residuals  from GMM panel  data estimation.  Controlling  for
annual income per capita, national urban population,  openness to trade, national land area,
kilometers  of inland  waterways,  and whether  the city is a port  or a national  capital,  the coefficients
are the magnitude  by which primacy  is less or greater  compared  to European  and North  American
countries.  Column  1 gives numbers  which average  over 1975-1995  (with  five-year  time intervals)  for
regions  of the  world. Column  2 is  for Poland,  where  effects  are allowed  to vary over  time.  An asterisk
indicates  a coefficient  significant  at  the 5% level.
Urban  concentration  describes  the magnitude  of agglomeration  of urban activity
in  a  country compared to  other  countries. A  typical measure of  urban
concentration  is primacy - the share of the  largest city  in  national urban
population.**  The numbers  in the table tell us the extent to which primacy  in a
region or country differs from what is expected, given a country's size and
economic  circumstances.  Mean  primacy  worldwide  is .31,  so a coefficient  of -.13
means primacy is 43% less than expected.  The table indicates that in ECA
countries,  primacy  is much lower  than in other countries.  The ECA region  is an
outlier. Poland  also has lower  primacy  than expected,  with the extent of under-
concentration  rising  over  time.
**Given  the strong fit of the rank-size relationship in most countries (see next box), primacy and other measures
of urban concentration are highly correlated.
The concern with low primacy is that scale economies inherent in the urbanization process are not being
sufficiently exploited,  resulting  in  productivity  and  growth  losses.  Econometric  work  in  Henderson
(1999)  suggests  that  conditional  on  country  characteristics  there  is  an  optimal  degree  of  urban
primacy/concentration and too little or too much results in really significant growth losses. For Poland at
more than  .05 below  best  primacy, this  translates  into 3/4 of a  percentage point  reduction  in annual
growth  rate  of  GDP  per  capita.  This  problem  may  grow  as  the  economy  shifts  increasingly  into
production of modern business, financial and professional services. Such activities as they complement
R&D and headquarters activities seem to best thrive in large urban environments. This concern with lack
of urban agglomeration is further heightened when one looks internally in Poland at the size distribution
of cities.
Box 2 reveals that, within Poland as we move down the urban hierarchy, city sizes decline more rapidly
than expected compared to other countries. That is, cities in Poland are farther apart in size than usual, so
that most cities are relatively small compared to Katowice. Put together, we have a relatively small largest
urban area in Poland, with sizes of other cities dropping off quickly. This suggests an economy-wide lack
of exploitation of the local scale externalities inherent in market economies. These external economies-
5efficient local supplier networks, a large shared pool of specialized workers and knowledge spillovers due
to the ease of information exchange-were  well described by Alfred Marshall in 1890  and have been part
of the economics research agenda since then.
Box 2: Urban  Hierarchies: Zipf's  Law
Poland:  Rank  Size  Coefficient
(The  elasticity  of rank  with respect  to size)
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995
.74  .79  .82  .86  .90  .90
The rank size coefficient  is from a regression  of In (rank) = a  - ,3 In (urban area population).
Standard  errors  range  from .017  to .019 with R 2, of .98  - .99. The  sample  in each year  consists  of
the five UN urban  agglomerations  for Poland  plus 26 municipalities,  where  each  municipality  pretty
well  defines  the relevant  urban  area.  See  Gabaix  (1999)  and Black  and Henderson  (1999).
Geographers  and economists  have noted an empirical regularity  for most
countries  around the world. In any country, if urban areas are ranked from
largest  (1) to smallest,  then rank multiplied  by population  size is approximately
the same for all cities in the economy.  That is, the elasticity (defined  to be
positive)  of rank  with respect  to population  size  is one, so a 1%  decline  in urban
area rank is associated  with a  1% decline in size as we move down the
hierarchy  of cities in a country.  Indeed,  a recent  UN evaluation  found  the mean
and median  of the elasticities  in a sample  of 22 countries  worldwide  to be close
to  one. Poland's elasticities are significantly less than  one, as  the table
indicates,  although  the elasticity  has risen in recent  years. Elasticities  less than
one  mean as  city  sizes decline down the  hierarchy, there is  a  smaller
associated  change  in rank. Fewer  cities lie in any city size  interval  and  city sizes
are spaced  further  apart than in a typical  country.
Changes  in Agglomeration.
In the  period 1950-1990, there  was some significant increase in the  degree of urban  concentration  in
Poland. Box 2 notes some possible reduction in city size inequality up to  1990. In Box 3, we explore this
possibility in more detail. As is the case internationally, cities in the top echelon don't change rank over
time-the  big stay  big  in the  order they  started  off,  given  their  large  infrastructure  stocks,  human
resources,  and  political  power  (see  Eaton  and  Eckstein,  1997). In  Poland  the  five  dominant  urban
agglomerations as defined  by the United Nations,  including Katowice, continue to  grow in the  1990's.
These agglomerations are all growing but the populations of their central cities (i.e., the municipalities)
are  shrinking. This  suggests that  there  may  be  some degree  of  internal metro  area deconcentration,
"suburbanization",  or peri-urban development occurring.  Table  I below gives the numbers on suburban
gain for the main metro areas with a single core city.
6Table  1: Population of major cities and urban agglomerations
Population ('000)
city  urban agglomeration  suburban gain
1990  90-95  1990  90-95  90-95
change  change
Warsaw  1656  -21  2165  54  75
Katowice  360  -8  3357  68  76
Krakow  744  1  806  26  25
Lodz  838  -15  1030  11  26
Figure  1: Population growth in urban agglomerations 1950-1995
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Below the top echelon, there is lots of upward and downward mobility in rankings of cities, with cities
moving up and down the hierarchy as circumstances and production patterns change in cities and in their
7surrounding regions. Figure  1 demonstrates this  visually, comparing  1950 with  1995. The map  shows
some remarkable growth of what were small cities in 1950. Box 3 also shows that, not only have cities
moved up and down the hierarchy, but the variance of the relative size distribution of cities has shrunk
considerably. This potentially  desirable trend  of smaller  size cities slowly  starting to  catch up  to the
biggest cities seems to have slowed in the late 1980's and ground to a halt in the first half of the 1990's.
Box 3: Are Small Cities Catching  Up to Big Cities?
(a) Change  in Rank  in the Size Distribution
top 5  top 10  bottom  21
no. of cities  since 1950  0  2  20
changing  since 1960  0  0  20
(b) Annual  Speed  of "Convergence"
1950  - 1995  .0058
1980- 1985  .0051
1985  - 1990  .0026
1990  - 1995  0
(c) Variance  of Relative  City Sizes
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995
88.3  87.2  80.8  75.9  70.8  71.5
In part  (b),  the annual  speed  of convergence  is A where 1  = (1- exp (-XT))  for  T  the length  of the time interval  and 1
the coefficient  from a regression  In (city  pop(t))  - In (city pop(t-1)) =  a - D In (city  pop(t-1)).  An asterisk  indicates  a
coefficient  significant  at the 5% level. In part (c), since  size populations  are increasing  over time with technological
change,  we focus on the relative size distribution  - sizes of cities divided  by average  city size at that time. The
variance  is  for that  variable.  For  the USA  it is essentially  constant  over  time.
There are three aspects  to catching  up in most analyses  of city size distributions.  The first
concerns  stability  of rankings  by size. In general  in countries  there is great stability  in rankings
at the top  of the size distribution  and  this is the case  in Poland.  From 1960  - 1995,  no cities  in
the largest 10 changed  rank,  while 20 out of 21 of the rest moved up or down in the urban
hierarchy.  The big stay relatively  big, with little significant  switching  in relative  size. Mobility
and change  in rank  is at  the lower  end  of the distribution.
Mobility  is also measured  by the speed  of convergence  - the annual  rate at which small cities
are catching  up  to big ones. But in the case of city size distributions,  there is no convergence
to a common city size, and, in many countries,  there is little change in the relative size
distribution  over time. "Convergence'  is usually  just regression  to the mean,  generated  by
upward  and  downward  mobility  among  cities below  the top echelon.  In Poland,  what  part (b) of
the table reveals  is the slowdown  in mobility  (or mean  reversion)  since 1985,  and especially
for 1990-1995.
What is interesting  in Poland,  compared  to Japan,  France  and  the USA  is that there has been
some real catching  up. The variance  of relative  city sizes declined  steadily  from 1950-1990.
After 1990,  consistent  with other analyses,  the system  has frozen  to some extent. Part (c) of
the table shows  the variance  of relative  city sizes  across  the 31 cities  declining  from 88 to 71
from 1950  to 1990.  This suggests,  consistent  with the increase  in the rank  size elasticity,  that
overall  smaller  cities have been  catching  up  to bigger  ones.
8At the provincial, rather than city level, patterns are similar. There is little mobility of provinces in the top
echelon, but lots of switches in ranks among the smaller urban centers. While the variance of relative total
populations is not shrinking, the variance of relative urban populations has decreased. And as with cities,
mobility, or "convergence" of provincial urban populations has declined in recent years. This change in
mobility of cities and provinces  is of some interest and  is explored next  in the context  of the general
urbanization and migration process in Poland.
The decline  in mobility  with transition
A map of baseline urbanization in 1985 is given in Figure 2, and Figure 3 shows that in the periods 1980-
1985  and  1985-1990 there  was  strong  growth  in many  of the  less  urbanized regions  in the  eastern
voivods, but after 1990, mobility all round dampens. This is surprising.
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The move to a market economy transformed the economic geography of Poland as we will see below,
with rapid expansion and declines of different industries in different voivods. That transformation  led to
9high unemployment  and  strong differentials in  unemployment rates across voivods  that were affected
differentially by transition. Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of unemployment rates  by voivod  in the
1990's, where unemployment increased drastically in the early 1990's, peaking around 1993/4. Since then
unemployment  has decreased considerably,  although less  so recently  in the  East  and  West. What  is
striking  in  Figure  5,  which  shows  unemployment  rates  for  1998,  is  the  enormous  differential  in
unemployment rates across voivods that are side-by-side. They remain very high in the Northern voivods,
some of which had fairly high initial concentrations of manufacturing, and high in the South-West corner
of the country, again a major heavy industry region.
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As  we  will  discuss  below,  some of  these  differentials  may  be  misleading,  given  that  some of  the
unemployed  may  regularly do  seasonal work  in Western  Europe. However these  big differentials  in
voivod unemployment rates are also accompanied by increasing wage differentials.
Table 2 below notes the increasing variance in relative wages, to be expected in a situation where wages
are  increasingly  determined  by  market  forces.  Given  increasing  wage  differentials  and  persistent
differentials in unemployment rates across even neighboring voivods, one would have expected migration
flows to increase. But, as we will discuss next, the opposite happened.
10Figure  5: Unemployment  by voivod, 1998  Table 2: Relative  wage variance  across
voivods
Manufacturing  Services
1994  1998  1994  1998
0.62  0.76  0.54  0.75
Unemployment
rate,  1998  (percent)  Note: Relative  wages  are voivod  wages  divided  by







The decline in mobility is reflected directly in migration figures. Box 4 andFigure 6 show the decline in
inter and intra provincial population flows. Of special interest is the decline in rural-urban migration and
the slight increase in urban-rural migration since transition. Something is inhibiting net migration within
Poland-from  the countryside into cites, as well as migration across cities. Significant factors  could be
international migration and the operation of housing markets, which we will discuss in the next sections.
Box  4: The Slow-Down of Migration
Gross  Migration  Flows  ('000)
Across  Voivods
Total  Urban-Urban  Urban-Rural  Rural-Rural  Rural-Urban
Avg. 1986-89  630  168  91  144  227
1994  438  130  90  90  129
Avg. 1997-98  422  123  100  86  113
Within Voivods
Total  Urban-Urban  Urban-Rural  Rural-Rural  Rural-Urban
1989  369  81  53  85  150
1994  277  64  63  61  87
Post-transition  migration  flows are lower  than in the past. Not only have  total flows across
and within provinces  decreased,  but rural to urban flows have dropped  enormously  and
urban to rural migration  has increased  modestly.  While in net, people are moving  from
rural  to urban  areas,  the pace  since  transition  has slowed.
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International  migration
International  migration  is a  complex  issue  in Poland since the  potentially  most  significant migration
dynamics are not captured in official statistics. Official permanent migration has often been significant in
Poland's history with large emigration to the United States, Canada and Western Europe.  Net migration
has been negative during the last four decades in all but three years (Figure 7). During the 1  990s, net out-
migration has been relatively low at between 11,000 and 20,000 following a large spike in out-migration
of 97,000 in 1988. The large outmigration in the late 1980s can be largely attributed to the movement of
ethnic Germans from Poland to West Germany. The magnitude of this migration has been much larger
from Poland than  from other countries  in East-Central Europe  (Table 3). By  1994 this  component of
international migration had become insignificant.
Figure 7: Net migration, 1960-1998  Table 3: Migration to (West) Germany from
the territories of the former CSFR and from
150  -------  Poland  and Hungary  ('000)
100  Ethnic German immigrants from:
°  0  o "."  - D  _Poland  CSFR  Hungary
-50
_100  1987  48.4  0.8  0.6
-150  1988  140.2  0.9  0.8
-200.  1989  250.3  2.0  1.6
-250  .
-350  1990  113.3  1.3  1.0
-350  1991  40.1  0.9  1.0
96°8  q6t8t  :e1992  17.7  0.5  0.4
1993  5.4  0.1  0.0
1994  2.4  0.0  0.0
Source:  Federal  Statistial  Office,  Germany
12In contrast to permanent migration, temporary migration continues to be very significant. Unfortunately,
there is very little statistical information  available about this type  of migration. A  microcensus in  1995
showed that about 900,000 Polish citizens spent more than 2 months abroad. This figure may well include
persons who  may  not actually  return to Poland.  While there  is  no  information  available from  Polish
statistics, we can assume that a large proportion of these temporary migrants travels to Western Europe on
official  work  visas.  Information  available  from  German  statistics  shows  that  in  the  mid-1990s
approximately  150,000 persons from Poland entered Germany as seasonal laborers to work mostly  in
agriculture, hotels and  restaurants (Table 4; see Engfer and  Seng, 1997). A smaller number entered as
contract workers employed mostly. in the construction sector.  It is likely that  an additional  number of
temporary migrants worked abroad without a working visa.
Table 4: Temporary labor migration to Germany
Seasonal labor  Contract workers
Poland  Hungary  Czech  Slovakia  Poland  Hungary  Czech  Slovakia
Republic  Republic
1993  143,861  5,346  12,027  7,781  1993  20,424  13,563  - -
1994  136,659  2,458  3,465  3,939  1994  13,496  9,055  1,656  1,405
1995  170,576  2,841  3,72  5,442  1995  24,187  9,116  2,151  2,048
Source:  Federal  Labor Office,  Germany
The 1995 microcensus carried out by the Polish Statistical Office shows that females tend to make up a
larger proportion of the younger temporary migrants while the number of males is larger  in older age
groups (Figure 8). Overall, the largest number of temporary migrants tend to be in the 25-39 age brackets.
Most  of  these  migrants  have  at  least  secondary  education  which  includes  vocational  training.
Unfortunately,  we  do  not have  information  on  the  origin  of temporary  migrants  within  Poland  by
urban/rural residence and voivod.
Figure 8: Characteristics of temporary migrants
Temporary  migrabon  Temporary  migration  by
by  age and  sex,  1995  education  level  and  sex,  1995
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13The implications of this  large movement of people seeking temporary employment  abroad are not well
studied. Typically  migration  should have  significant benefits  for  a  country. If  unemployment  in the
country of origin is high, pressure on local labor markets will be reduced. Returning migrants may bring
newly acquired  skills back  to their  country which will  benefit the  local economy. Most  importantly,
temporary migrants tend to transfer savings back to their home country which will increase local demand
as well as investment and capital formation.
Whether these benefits are realized  in the Polish case is unclear. Although unemployment  is still quite
high in many parts of the country, as shown elsewhere, it is fairly low in the economically most dynamic
parts  of the  country-most  notably  in Warsaw. Labor migration  abroad of young  and relatively  well
educated persons  may in fact reduce the  pool of skilled labor  in dynamically growing  industries and
service sectors. It is also unlikely that a significant transfer of skills will occur. While some temporary
migrants go abroad to acquire additional training, a considerable number of quite highly educated people
work in  jobs requiring little or no education in the agricultural sector, hotels, restaurants or construction.
Remittances and repatriation of earned income, in contrast, are very likely to have a large impact on the
local economy. While there are no official statistics available, some estimates suggest that the amount of
money transferred is very significant. A  study quoted by Engfer and Seng (1997) estimates that in the
1991-96 period about DM 6 billion (3 billion US$ at current exchange rate) were transferred by contract
workers in Germany alone. By comparison, total FDI to Poland was about I billion DM in 1994. At the
micro-level, an Austrian study carried out in 1994/5 showed that households which had sent at least one
household member  abroad in the previous  five years tended to  be better  off than  households without
migration;  although the difference among  Polish households was not statistically significant (Table 5).
This study found that in Poland, members of approximately 6.8% of all households surveyed had worked
abroad  in the  previous  five years  suggesting a  total  temporary  migration  of about  850,000. This  is
consistent with the microcensus and also supports evidence that a large proportion of temporary migrants
work abroad year after year, often for the same employer.
Table 5: Relative income position of households
with labor migration within the last five years
Poland  Hungary  Czech  Slovakia
Republic
without  migration  96  101  105  100
with  migration  114  176  141  113
Significance  of differences  0.333  0.029  0.016  0.079
Source:  Institut  fuer die Wissenschaften  vom  Menschen,  Vienna
Temporary labor migration may also provide a partial explanation for the low internal migration rates that
we have discussed elsewhere. Migrating to dynamically growing regions of the country may be hindered
by housing shortages (see next section) and other reasons. Working abroad for part of the year may be a
viable alternative, since the large wage differentials between Poland and Western Europe allow migrants
to  earn  as much  or more  income  abroad as they  would  in the  local economy.  The high  number of
temporary migrants also shows that the low rates of internal migration cannot be due to a lack of mobility
of the workforce in the sense of "willingness to move", since a  large number of workers readily travels
abroad to seek employment opportunities.
14Housing markets
A key  issue in population mobility may be continuing and even worsening  housing  shortages. People
can't move to desirable locations if there are no dwellings to move into. In 1988 the World Bank analyzed
how  housing  shortages  were  inhibiting  efficiency  in  migration  patterns  and  slowing  agglomerative
tendencies, as well  as representing a  missed  investment opportunity (Mayo and  Stein,  1988; see also
Pogodzinski,  1995). More  recent  statistics  show  that  the  situation  has  not  improved  significantly.
Interestingly,  Polish official  statistics  contain  only  limited information  on the  number  of households.
Instead, numbers are reported as the number of dwelling units per  1000 population. This figure was 302.3
in 1998 after a steady increase from 288.7 in 1990. However, this number is still significantly lower than
the Western European average of about 400 (Blunt and Muziol-Weclawowicz, 1998).
Box  5: Housing Tightness
(a) Ratio: households  to dwelling units
1980  1988  1995
Poland  1.18  1.12  1.13
ECA  1.07  --  --
Rest  of  .95  --  --
Europe
(b) Dwellings  completed  per thousand  population
1980-1985  1991-1995  1995-1998
Poland  5.3  2.6  1.9
(c) Ratio: investment in residential construction to GDP
1980  1995  1998
Poland  5.5  1.5  1.7
Poland  has  long been  known  for its extreme  housing  shortages  (see S-K. Mayo  and  J.l
Stein, 1988,  for a review  and the source  of 1980's numbers  in the table). In the 1980's
there  was improvement  in the ratio  of households  to dwelling  units,  although  the Polish
number  remained  18%  above  a European  norm.  Since  the later 1980's  the  situation  has
deteriorated.  Completed  dwellings  and the ratio of housing  investment  to GDP today
are a fraction  of Poland's  1980's  number,  which in themselves  were low by international
standards.
The increase in the total housing stock through the 1990s also hides a significant slump in new housing
construction. As Box 5 shows, although  the number of dwellings  per  1000 population has  improved,
Poland's  high  ratio of  households to  dwelling  units  has  actually  started  to  increase  again,  reflecting
declining  household  sizes.  At  the  same  time  dwelling  completion  rates  and  investment  rates  have
plummeted with signs of recovery only in the most recent years. Housing completion dropped drastically
from a high of  almost 140,000 or more than 4.5 per thousand population in 1992 to a low of just  over
60,000 or less than 2 per thousand population in  1996 (Figure 9). The situation is improving somewhat
15faster in urban than  in rural areas, although at current levels of housing construction the large pent-up
demand is unlikely to be satisfied in the foreseeable future.
Figure 9: Housing construction
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Regionally, the number of dwelling units per one thousand population is lower in the rural areas of the
southeast than in the more urbanized areas. This is in large part a reflection of the larger household sizes
in more traditional regions of the country (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Dwelling units per 1000 population by voivod
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Figure  11 provides additional detail showing trends in dwelling unit completion between  1990 and 1998.
While some of the more urbanized voivods,  including Warsaw and Gdansk, do not show a significant
drop-off in  dwelling  unit construction,  they  may  still  be  foci of  supply  shortages,  given the  excess
demand to migrate to these centers, indicated by their relatively low unemployment rates and high wages.
The large decline in Lodz and the very low levels of housing construction in Katowice are very notable. It
is interesting to note that some of the more rural regions of the countries-e.g.,  Bialystock-appear  to
have been  able to  maintain a relatively  high  level of housing  construction. It would be  interesting to
investigate  whether  this  may  be  due,  in  part,  to  private  housing  investment  by  temporary migrants
working abroad.
16Figure 11: Trends in housing construction by voivod, 1991-1998
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This brief survey of the housing sector leaves two questions. What  is inhibiting the functioning  of the
housing market, even relative to the situation before transition?  Second, as a research question, can we
directly link decreased migration to housing market shortages and show that there are voivods with strong
excess demand for housing? The first question has been addressed by a variety of writers, for example
Blunt and Muziol-Weclawowicz (September 1998).
To  help  answer the  second question,  Box  6  shows  that  migration  responds to  the  usual  wage  and
unemployment conditions. However migration is affected by housing availability. That does suggest that
housing shortages are in part responsible for choking off needed increases in agglomeration.
1  7Box 6: Housing Availability and Voivod Growth
Regression  Results  for Net Voivod  Migration
In(1993  1993  voivod  1994  urban  dwelling  units ('000)  R 2
voivod  unemployment  1994  urban  population
avg.  wage)  rate
net inter-  8427  -99.8  16,230,596  .638
voivod  (1799)  (27.0)  (8,279,066)
migration
Standard  errors  in parentheses.  *significant  at  5% level. Constant  term  not  reported.
The first regression  examines  net inter-voivod  migration in 1994 (data for years between 94 and 98 are not
available).  People  migrate  to regions  with higher wages (1993) and lower  employment  (1993).  But an important
variable  is the availability  of housing: the number  of dwelling  units in urban areas in 1994 divided by urban
population.  A standard  deviation  of that variable  is .0000195.  Thus a one standard  deviation  increase  in dwelling
units  per population  raises  voivod  net  migration  by 316,  about  20% of  a standard  deviation  of  the migration  variable.
Housing  availability  appears  as though  it could  be a key determinant  of migration.  This would
suggest that the  shut-down in  construction is  inhibiting market adjustment, especially
migration,  that would  lead to more efficient  urban agglomerations.  To really  explore  this topic
would require  more  detailed  data on migration  over the transition  time period,  combined  with
data  on housing  completions  (as  opposed  to the above  data  on housing  stocks).
Implications
Poland has a low degree of urban concentration on an international scale, having overall relatively small
cities. With transition,  the  introduction of market  forces, and the transformation  of the  economy into
increased service production and  rearrangement of priorities  in the industrial  sectors, one would have
expected  considerable  population  movements.  Regions  would  have  shifted  production  patterns  and
population moved in response. With the market emphasis on localized scale externalities, the extent of
urban agglomeration would have risen. Instead population movements, movements of cities through the
size  distribution,  and  urban  agglomeration  processes  have  stagnated.  The  question  is  why?  Some
possibilities  come  to  mind.  One  is  economic  depression  in  cities  relative  to  the  countryside.  This
contradicts the overall picture of what is happening in Poland, with agriculture  stagnant since the early
1990's. A  commonly  cited  explanation  involves  the  urban  housing  market  and  indeed  the  already
extremely  tight Polish  housing  market  has tightened  further  since transition,  with  construction  rates
plummeting.  These issues are explored further in the following section on regional patterns of economic
activity and employment.
1811.  Economic  sector  transformation  and  growth
Introduction and summary
As a former  Soviet bloc country, we expect Poland will differ from market economies  in its economic
geography in significant ways. This note explores the extent to which this is the case, how with transition
the economic geography is changing, and what on-going peculiarities stand out. Key findings are:
1)  Manufacturing and agricultural activity are spatially concentrated, as expected. But services  are also
fairly  concentrated,  which  is unusual.  Services  are  generally  not  traded  across  regions,  so  they
command similar shares of employment across regions. In Poland, there are unusually high variations
in service sector shares of total employment across voivods.
2)  Manufacturing is spreading out with the introduction of market forces. There is convergence both in
the sense of mean reversion  and declines  in the variance of employment across voivods. Location
decisions  may  be  responding  more  to  voivod  comparative  advantages,  growing  in  certain  low
employment areas and contracting in some high employment areas.
3)  The concentration  in service sectors is increasing. There is also general divergence of employment
patterns with larger centers growing more quickly than smaller ones-a  very unusual finding. While
Warsaw may attract certain financial and specialized business services that are typically found in the
largest metro areas, that does not explain general divergence. Nor is divergence simply replacement
in  former  large  manufacturing  centers  or  areas  of high  unemployment.  It  is  general.  When the
national expansion of the service sector stabilizes, this pattern should revert to one of convergence,
where smaller centers will start to grow faster than larger ones.
4)  Voivod  specialization  is less than  expected for  a  former planned  economy.  Specialization  is also
declining,  so  that  today  at  the  voivod  level there  is relatively  modest  specialization.  Given  the
localization benefits  of  own  industry specialization,  it  is surprising,  perhaps even  alarming,  that
industries  have  not  started to  reconcentrate.  One  of the  reasons  may  be  limited  labor  mobility,
inhibiting specific skill workers from reconcentrating in areas that have a comparative advantage in
their area of productive skills.
Aspects of the economic geography of Poland
There is a consensus that, prior to transition, Poland like other ECA countries was over-industrialized. As
a result, manufacturing employment fell by about 25% from 1986 to 1995, before stabilizing. Growth was
in the service sectors, such as retailing, finance, and business and real estate.  Box 7 below reveals that
service sector growth is continuing,  with large expansions from  1994-1998 in the hotel  and restaurant,
finance and business service sectors. This change in national economic sector composition has differential
effects across region. To explore that, we discuss regional concentration and then regional specialization,
examining changes in these with transition.
19Box  7: Industry  Growth  and Concentration
Industry  Growth  and Inter-industry  Concentration  Differences
Agric-  Manu-  Trade  Finance  Hotels,  Real  Estate,
ulture  facturing  Restau-  Business
rants  Services
1994-1998  national  .075  .0094  .113  .261  .298  .420
employment  growth




* The  base  level  average  concentration  index  for manufacturing  industries.
For  an  industry  the  index  of  national  concentration  is  the  sum  over  49 voivods  of  squared  differences  of  the  share  of
the voivod in national  employment  of that industry  from the voivod's share  of total national  employment.  For an
industry,  if each  voivod's  share of its national  employment  mimics  the  voivod's  share of total national  employment,
the index  is zero. The industry  is perfectly  spread  out, or deconcentrated.  As an industry's  spread  of employment
starts  to  deviate  from  the  general  spatial  spread  of  employment,  the index  rises.  At  the  limit  the  index  can  approach
2, when  an industry  is found  in just one region  whose share  of general  national  employment  is miniscule.  Then  the
industry  is  perfectly  concentrated.  See  Ellison  and  Glaeser  (1997)  for  details.
In row 2, the numbers are how much each industry's  concentration  index is higher or lower than the one for
manufacturing  which averages .053. The results are from a regression  pooling the 1994 and 1998 indices of
concentration  of each  of the 49 2-digit  industries.  Controls  in the  regression,  which  has an R
2 of .55, are a 1998  year
dummy  (insignificant),  national  employment  in each  industry  (for  either  1994  or 1998),  and  dummy  variables  for 11 of
the 1-digit  industries  (i.e.,  all 23 2-digit  manufacturing  industries  in each  of 1994  and 1998  get one dummy  variable
for manufacturing).  Industry  concentration  declines significantly  with national  employment.  Controlling  for national
employment,  agriculture  is the  most  concentrated  industry.  It is followed  by manufacturing,  public  administration,  and
business  services.  As  is the  case in most economies,  trade, hotels and restaurants,  and finance are less
concentrated.
Row 1 of the table enumerates  what we know already. Manufacturing  has stagnated in
Poland,  while the service sector has expanded.  The table shows two oddities. First is the
expansion  of agriculture  which we will suggest  below could be due to restrictions  on labor
mobility.  The second  oddity  concerns  concentration  in services.  In general  in more  developed
economies  as the table suggests manufacturing  is more concentrated  than finance, hotel,
and  trade  services.  However  in Poland  real  estate  and business  services  are as concentrated
as manufacturing.  In fact once one strips  away real estate  services,  sectors  such as renting
of machinery  and equipment,  computer services, R&D, and other business  activities are
highly  concentrated.  Some  seem  for the moment  to be more  confined  to Warsaw.
20Regional concentration
Because of  agglomeration economies  and  natural  resource locations, economic  sectors are  unevenly
distributed spatially. Figure 12 shows how the  sectoral composition of economic activity varies across
voivods  in 1998. Figure  13 shows for each sector its share of total voivod employment-  and thus its
relative  importance in the  regional economy-as  well  as the sector's  employment growth rate for the
1994-98 period. In developed economies agriculture and manufacturing tend to be the more concentrated
industries spatially, with the latter concentrating both to exploit scale economies  in production and to
have access to natural resource deposits.
Figure 12: Employment by major sector, 1998
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21Figure 13: Sectoral employment shares and growth rates
Sectoral  share  of total voivod  Sectoral  employment  growth
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22As Figure 13 indicates, this is the case in Poland where agriculture tends to be in the farmlands of the East
and heavy industry concentrated in the West and South-West near coal and iron ore resources. Moreover
there is considerable variation in the sector shares across voivods, ranging from 4 to 64% for agriculture
and 8 to 31% for manufacturing.
In contrast, in developed countries, trade (retail and wholesale), finance, and business services tend to be
more  ubiquitous  (see  Kolko,  1999).  Unlike  manufactured  and  agricultural  products,  many  service
activities are not traded across cities-they  are produced and consumed locally. In Poland, from Figure 13
there is considerable variation in service shares in total employment across voivods. While the variation
in trade is less than in manufacturing and agriculture, ranging from 7 to 21%, it is still extremely high. In
the USA for example, the share of trade in state employment in 1980 lay between 17.6 and 23.7% across
all  states. In  Box 7  above,  which  presents  concentration  indices,  it  is the  case  that  agriculture  and
manufacturing are more spatially concentrated than trade, hotels and restaurants, and financial services in
Poland. However real estate and business services are as concentrated as manufacturing. Moreover, as we
will see, concentration in all these service sectors is increasing. Rather than widespread development of
services sectors, there is increasing concentration.
Transition  has  brought  with  it  spatial  reorganization  of  production.  The  biggest  initial  shock  from
transition was the initial cut in manufacturing employment  noted earlier. After manufacturing bottomed
out around 1994, since then, from Figure 13, it appears that manufacturing growth is highest  in voivods
with relatively little manufacturing and slowest in the dominant centers. That suggests manufacturing is
spreading  out.  These  contrasting  processes  where  manufacturing  is  spreading  and  services  are
concentrating are of considerable interest.
We start by looking at "mobility" of manufacturing employment. In Box 8, prior to transition, there was
limited mobility of manufacturing shares among regions, in the sense that small manufacturing voivods
grow at about the same rate as large ones. After transition, Poland reverts to a traditional market pattern in
countries where there is significant mean reversion (Blanchard and Katz,  1992). Small centers move up
the size distribution and large ones move down. Mean reversion is a standard  phenomenon, in response
to sector and location shocks.
Moreover in Poland, manufacturing spread beyond traditional centers, presumably in response to market
forces  emphasizing  inherent voivod  comparative  advantages.'  The most rapidly  declining  centers  are
traditional manufacturing  ones predominately  in the  South-West. Rapid  growth centers  include  areas
around Warsaw (Skiemiewice) and Gdansk (Slupsk and Elblask). It  is possible that these represent the
start  of  development  of  satellite  cities  to  these  metro  areas.  In  interpreting  these  growth  numbers,
especially for the voivods around Gdansk, we must recognize that  some "growth" could be recovery in
high unemployment areas, although conditional convergence regressions suggest unemployment in 1994
does not explain any variation in voivod manufacturing employment growth rates from 1994 to 1998.
1 When  we say "spreads",  the  term could  be misleading.  Given  very restricted  population  and labor  force mobility  across  voivods,  it is not that
manufacturing  is moving  from  one voivod  to another  per se. Rather  it is that manufacturing  employment  in established  manufacturing  centers  is
moving  into other  local industries,  while  in growing  manufacturing  centers,  local labor  is switching  from other industries  into  manufacturing.
23Box  8: Manufacturing Mobility
Manufacturing Employment: Convergence and Variances
1980-92  1992-98  1994-98
Annual  Speed  of  .0013  .033  .016
Convergence
1980  1992  1998
Variance  of Relative  78.2  95.1  34.5
Employment
The annual speed of convergence  uses industrial  employment  data by voivod for 1980 and 1992 and
manufacturing  employment  data (i.e.,  no mining)  for 1994  and 1998.  The annual  speed  of convergence  is
from a regression  In (employ  (t)) - In  (employ  (t-1))  = a-  In  (employ  (t-1)).  An asterisk  indicates  a coefficient
significant  at the 95%  level.  The  variance  of relative  employment  is the variance  ofX  X,  where XR  is the
voivod  value  and X  the  average  across  voivods.
A  measure of  the  degree of  mobility in  a  given time period is  the  speed of
convergence.  Here  that means  the speed  of reversion  to the mean  - how  quickly  small
employment  centers move up the distribution  and large ones move down. Prior to
transition,  manufacturing  displayed  little mobility  and mean  reversion,  so big and small
employment  voivods  grew at the same rate on average.  Katowice,  in particular,  was a
strong  performer  in the 1980-92  time period.  Post-transition  Poland  starts  to look like
market  economies  with a considerable  degree  of mean  reversion.  Some  small  centers
grew  quickly  while some  large  ones, especially  Katowice,  declined.  The 92-98  speed  of
convergence  is very large, while 94-98 is more settled. 1992 is the bottom of the
economic  cycle in the  transition  period.
Not only did mobility speed up post-transition,  but the variance of overall relative
manufacturing  employment  fell dramatically.  This is real employment  convergence.
Small centers grew quickly and very large ones declined,  spreading  manufacturing
employment  more  evenly  in Poland.
In contrast to the spreading out of manufacturing, service sector activities appear to be concentrating (Box
9).  The large increase  in concentration  indices might be explained by  dramatic growth of one  or two
established centers. As we will see there is very high concentration of certain traded services in Warsaw.
But what is happening is more than this. There is general overall divergence of employment patterns for
these  industries, with,  in  general, established  centers growing  more  quickly  than  smaller  centers,  as
indicated in Box 9. A series of graphs in the Appendix shows for each of these industries the plots of local
sectoral employment growth against base period local sectoral employment.  Manufacturing shows the
expected negative correlation, but for services the slope is positive, indicating divergence. Points I and 14
are Warsaw and Katowice.
General divergence like this is extremely unusual. This fast growth of larger centers compared to smaller
ones is not explained  by  larger centers having had  initial  high unemployment  or  high manufacturing
employment. Conditional convergence regressions still show divergence, and initial unemployment rates
24or manufacturing employment levels have no explanatory power and no consistent effect. In general there
is universal economic sector convergence, or mean reversion across regions, except in circumstances like
this, where there is a major transformation of the economy and local industrial bases. Once these sectors
have fully expanded, we would expect to see a shift back to a pattern of mean reversion in these industries
as well. That is, growth will slow in the larger centers and pick-up in smaller ones.
Box  9: Concentration  of Services
Concentration  Indices  and Divergence
Retail  Finance  Real  Estate  &
Services  Business  Services
Concentration  Index:
1994  .0012  .0054  .022
1998  .0025  .0073  .026
Speed  of Divergence  .019  .012  .002
1994-1998
The concentration  measures  are discussed  in Box 7 and the speed  of convergence/divergence  in Box 8. For
the latter,  an asterisk  indicates  the coefficient  is significant  at the 95% level.  Finance  and real estate-business
services  are 1-digit  industries.  Retail  is the (major)  2-digit  component  of trade.
The concentration  indices  for retail, finance,  and real estate-business  services  rose by
108%, 35% and  18% respectively. In contrast the concentration  index for overall
manufacturing  industries  fell by 12% from 1954-1998,  indicating  the general spread of
manufacturing.  In the last row of the table, while in general across space there is
"convergence" or  mean reversion in  employment, during this  time  of  economic
adjustment  in Poland,  there is divergence.  Established  service  centers on average  are
growing  much more quickly, led by Warsaw  in the retailing  and finance sectors,  than
small  centers.
Having looked at overall concentration, we now take a more detailed look at the voivods of most intense
concentration, especially Warsaw and Katowice. Box 10 reiterates that traditional heavy industries tend to
be spatially concentrated, both to exploit agglomeration economies and to be near resource deposits. But
it also tells us that the high tech sector and, partly related, exportable services sector (R&D, computer and
certain  business services) are  concentrated  in Warsaw. Overall  manufacturing has  no  dominant  sub-
sector in Warsaw and is stagnant. Warsaw appears to be the heart of modernization of the Polish economy
and in an economic sense the primate city in Poland, offering the highest wages in all sectors. It also has a
low unemployment  rate, under  3%  in  1998, when the rest  of the  country had  a  rate  over  10%. The
surprise, at  least until one considers the constraints on labor mobility in Poland, is that  Warsaw is not
growing more rapidly.
Katowice, which is considered the primate city according to UN definitions, offers an interesting contrast.
It is the heavy industry center of Poland, an odd position for a primate  city in a  somewhat developed
economy. Not  surprisingly, heavy industry has declined since transition.  Katowice lost  25,000 jobs  in
basic  metals  manufacturing  between  1994  and  1998. Where  did  these  people  go?  Katowice  has  a
25Box  10: Spatial Agglomeration and Concentration
Regions  Which Have  Over 20%  of National  Employment  of an Industry
Region  Industry  1994  share  1998  share  of
of national  national
employment  employment
Warsaw  publishing  .38  .36
computers  .53  43
communications  equip.  .35  .37
instruments  .28  .22
computer  services  .28  .29
R&D  .46  .50
business  services  .20  .22
membership  organizations  .21  .57
recreations  activities  .20  .21
Katowice  petroleum  products  .28  .27
basic  metals  .41  .35
Krakow  equipment  rental  .33  .09
tobacco  .29  .30
Lodz  textiles  .22  .22
Opole  petroleum  products  .29  .30
Plock  petroleum  .29  .30
Rzeszow  non-motor  vehicle  .25  .26
transport  equip.
The table shows  that seven  voivods  have  very high concentrations  of industrial  activity.  Some
of these are centered  around  natural resource  extraction  or processing  (petroleum,  metals);
some represent  the exploitation  of agglomeration  economies  (textiles,  transport  equipment).
Warsaw  clearly is the high tech, R&D  and business  services  center of the economy,  as well
as publishing.
relatively  low  unemployment  rate  and  relatively  low  wages  (despite  being  the  largest  urban
agglomeration). Katowice has had strong growth in finance and business services, although the size of
these sectors is much smaller than in Warsaw. One of the fastest growing major sectors in Katowice is
agriculture, which gained 20,000 jobs from 1994 to 1998. Food processing also expanded significantly. In
fact Katowice is the voivod with the highest growth in agricultural employment from 1994-98 in Poland.
This is not de-urbanization; the urban area of Katowice continues to grow slowly in population and as just
noted is becoming more service oriented. But  it may suggest that  some workers have moved back into
agriculture, as industry has declined.  The choice to go back to agriculture  may reflect the  inability of
skilled manufacturing workers to move to voivods with better job opportunities for them.
26Regional  specialization
So far we have examined  industrial  concentration.  Specialization  is a different cut on geography.  It deals,
as in Figure 13,  with sector  composition  of a voivod,  while concentration  refers  to how much  of a sector's
activity is concentrated  in one or a few voivods. For many manufactured  activities, specialized  voivods
are often also centers of national employment  concentration  for that industry. But very diverse centers
such as Warsaw  are home to certain concentrated  industries  as in Box 10, which however claim a small
portion  of Warsaw's  overall employment.  Here we look at industrial  sectors in which voivods specialize,
with reasonably  high proportions  of their employment  in just one industry.
Figure 14:  Voivods  with large  specialization  in selected  sectors
M  an  ufa  cturi  ng
Textiles  (1  7)
ffJl  Apparel  and  furnery  (18)
E  Chemicals  and  chemical  products  (24)
El  Non-metallic  mineral  products  (26)
3  Basic  metals  (27)
3  Metal  products  (excl.
machinery  and  equipment)  (28)
z  Machinery  and  equipment  (29)
Othertransport  equipment  (35)
Transport,  Storage  and Communication  ,
R  Landandpipelinetransport(60)
In  market  and  planned  economies,  for  somewhat  different  reasons,  there  is a  reasonable  degree of
specialization across cities and regions in manufacturing production. We don't have city data on Poland,
so we examine non-agricultural employment to try to get a sense of production patterns in urbanized areas
in voivods. Since voivods in Poland are small, comparable to a reasonable  size USA. county, they  are
typically dominated by one urban area. While some planned economies had intense local specialization,
that was not the case  in Poland. In Figure  14 we  show voivods which  are fairly specialized  and their
27industry of specialization for 1994 and 1998. The map indicates voivods in which an industry's share of
that voivod's non-agricultural employment exceeds 5% and this share is at least three times the share of
the  industry in national non-agricultural  employment  (so that  we  do  not just  list industries  with  big
national shares of total employment).
Box  11: Voivod Specialization
(a) Degree  of  Voivod  Specialization
1994  1998
all non-agricultural  .0050  .0039
employment
manufacturing  .043  .036
employment
(b) Determinants of Specialization  in Non-Agricultural  Employment
In  (non-agricultural  year= 1998  N  R 2
voivod  employment)
-.0015  -.00096  98  .26
(.00029)  (.00038)
In part  (a)  the index  of specialization  is the sum over  48 two-digit  non-agricultural  industries  (including  construction,
hotels, public administration,  education,  and health)  for each voivod of the square of the difference  between
industry  's share of voivod non-agricultural  employment  and the share of industry  in national  non-agricultural
employment.  If the voivod mimics  national  composition  of employment  by sector,  the voivod is perfectly  diverse
and the index  has a value  of zero. As  voivod employment  composition  starts  to deviate  from the nation  the index
rises.  At the limit  the index  approaches  two, when  a voivod  has all of its employment  in one industry  and most  of
national  employment  is completely  specialized  relative  to the nation.  The index  for manufacturing  is based  on the
23 2-digit  manufacturing  employment  shares  in all-manufacturing.
In part b, the index  for each voivod for both 1994 and 1998  is regressed  against  total voivod non-agricultural
employment  for that year  and a dummy  variable  if the year is 1998.  Terms  such as an interaction  between  1998
and  voivod  employment  and  the scale  of agriculture  were  insignificant.
Between 1994 and 1998, the average of the index of specialization  in non-agricultural
employment  by voivods  fell by 22% and for specialization  in manufacturing  employment  fell
by 16%. In 42 of 49 provinces  the index  of non-agricultural  employment  specialization  fell,
and in 41 of 49 provinces  the index of manufacturing  specialization  fell. The regression
indicates  that  the degree  of voivod  specialization  declines  with voivod  employment  scale, a
standard  result.  Bigger  local  economies  are more  diverse.  The regression  also  confirms  that
controlling  for voivod scale, regional  specialization  declined  in Poland  significantly  in just
four years. The decline  in specialization  for 1998  relative  to 1994 of .00096  represents  a
20% decline  from  the mean  1994  value.
The industries of specialization are the usual manufacturing ones-textiles,  apparel, metals, machinery,
transport  equipment,  and  so  on.  These  are  industries  subject  to  localization  economies,  where
standardized production in market economies tends to be located in cities specialized in that product. But
in Poland no voivod is intensely specialized with even 10% of its non-agricultural employment in just one
industry. That is very unusual (Henderson, 1988). Moreover there has been a dramatic decline in voivods
28classified as specialized from 1994 to  1998. This reflects a general decline in regional  specialization, a
puzzling aspect of Poland's geographic development.
In  Box  11, we  show that  specialization  is  related  to  voivod  employment  size,  with  the  degree  of
specialization declining  with scale,  a  standard finding.  We also  show that  overall specialization  and
manufacturing  specialization in voivods  declines  sharply from  1994 to  1998. While  moving  from a
planned to market economy might be associated with declining local specialization-the  elimination of
the one factory town-Polish  voivods were never highly specialized. Since transition one would expect
much more rearrangement and reconcentration, as opposed to  simple overall declines  in the degree of
specialization. Transition should involve reorganization as regions shift employment towards their sectors
of comparative advantage. With that we would expect re-agglomeration in manufacturing,  in order to
properly exploit scale economies. However, in Poland re-agglomeration may be hindered by the lack of
labor mobility. So skilled workers in one manufacturing sector in an established but declining voivod are
unable to reconcentrate in voivods  that are starting to  expand. Thus expansion of those voivods  into
specialized centers is inhibited. Instead workers shift into other local activities such as agriculture, certain
service activities, become unemployed, or work abroad for a period each year.
29Ill.  Demographic  patterns
Introduction  and summary
In this  note, we discuss a number of interesting demographic patterns  in Poland. Population dynamics
both influence and are a reflection of the characteristics of labor and housing markets. The observations
discussed here  agree  with our  findings elsewhere that  significant  barriers  appear to  hinder dynamic
adjustments in population distribution and local economic activity.
1)  Poland's  population  has  been  stabilizing  at  around  38.6  million  with  fertility  rates  at  about
replacement level. While  rural  population has  been  near  constant  since  1946, urban  population
increased significantly. However, the proportion of the population living in urban areas is still fairly
low at 62% compared to most industrialized countries.
2)  Mortality among males  is very high. This  is largely a reflection of a  high rate of cardiovascular
diseases. Although male mortality rates have been  improving from a  low in  1991, the  difference
between male and female life expectancy is still quite high.
3)  Poland shows very distinct sex ratio differentials between urban and rural areas. There tend to be
more females than males in urban areas, while the reverse is true to an even greater extent in rural
regions. These differences  appear to have  declined slightly  over the  last decade. It  is not clear,
however, whether this recent trend toward a more even sex ratio in urban areas is due to social or
economic changes, or whether this is another reflection of barriers to migration that may be limiting
the influx of women in young working age into the cities.
4)  Population projections predict future demographic dynamics due to lifestyle changes similar to those
observed in other countries. The trend toward declining family sizes and an increase in single person
households will lead to a considerable increase in the demand for housing. This will likely put further
strains on an already very tight housing market.
Main  demographic  trends
The total population of Poland was 38.7 million at the end of 1998. In 1946, Poland's population stood at
23.8 million of which only 32.6% lived in urban areas (Figure 15). By  1967, the population was evenly
divided between urban and rural. In 1998 about 62% of population was urban. Over the entire period, the
rural population stayed approximately constant between  14.5 and  16 million, while  urban population
increased rapidly. Urban  growth rates  exceeded 2% for most years until  1980. Since then  they.have
decreased steadily and are now very close to zero. While declining natural population growth rates are not
unusual  for  industrialized  countries,  demographic  patterns  in  Poland  show  a  number  of  unusual
characteristics that are discussed below.





.°  20Xl  ii  |  li|-ra|
-&  15  .m
S  B!  I  !!  '1§11  lipE  '4
Excess male mortality
The crude death rate in Poland was 9.7 in 1998, which represents a slight decrease from a high of 10.6 in
1991  . Life expectancy at birth was 68.9 for males and 77.3 for females (Table 6). This is about 5-8 years
less than  in some Western European countries  such as France,  Switzerland and  Sweden.  Since  1960
female life expectancy increased 6.7 years compared to 4 years for males. This points to a higher relative
mortality among men.
Table 6: Life expectancy at birth  Figure 16: Life expectancy at age 45
Year  Female  Male
1960  70.6  64.9  35
1970  73.3  66.6  3
1980  74.4  66.0
1990  75.5  66.5  1  -female
1998  77.3  68.9  ......  male
_  27
25
CI  o  0  C0O (0  -4  X  CO  °  0)  °  I
This high mortality can be partially attributed to a high incidence of cardiovascular diseases-estimated
to account for 50% of all deaths-caused  by high levels of alcoholism, smoking and bad nutrition among
working age adult males. Industrial pollution may contribute to this high mortality. AsFigure  16 shows,
life expectancy for 45 year old males was actually lower in 1998 than it was in 1960, although it has been
improving from a low of 25.6 in 1991.
31Figure 17: Life expectancy at birth, deviation from national level
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Figure 17 shows that life expectancy  is generally  higher in the rural regions of the southeast  and, for
females, in the northeast  of the country.  It is lower in the more industrialized  westem part of the country,
and is lowest for males in the voivods to the west of Warsaw-Skiemiewice and Lodz-as  well as in
Jelenia Gora in the southwest  and Chelm in the east. All but the first of these are among  the 27 areas
identified  by the Polish govemment  as heavily polluted areas. For instance,  Lodz and Jelenia Gora have
some of the highest concentrations  of S02 emissions  (Weclawowicz  1996).  Figure 18 below shows that
life expectancy  is increasing  everywhere.  However,  the magnitude  of these gains is not uniform  although
there is no distinct spatial pattern. The maps also confirm  our observation  that male life expectancy  is
catching  up somwhat  from the 1991  low.
Figure 18: Gain in life expectancy  at birth, 1991-1998
Female  Male
years
2- 3  C32
32Rural-urban  sex ratio differentials
The demographic  structure  of Poland's  population  displays some interesting  characteristics.  Overall,  as in
most countries, there is a larger number of women than men. The sex ratio, defined by the number of
males per 100  females, was 94.6 in 1998.  Geographically,  however,  the patterns are more varied.  Figure
19 shows the overall population distribution by sex, age and urban and rural residence. Figure 20
summarizes  this information  by showing  the sex ratios for different  age groups for the entire population
as well as by urban  and rural residence.
Figure 19: Population  by age, sex and
residence,  1998  Figure  20: Population  by age, sex and residence,
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The charts show large imbalances  in sex ratios for adult age groups in urban and rural areas. While the
very low sex ratios for age groups above 60 can be attributed to the significantly lower male life
expectancy,  the large differences  in sex ratios between urban and rural areas reflect a more complex
pattern. Generally,  there are many more women  than men in urban areas with the reverse  pattern in rural
areas. In  1998 there were about 417,000 more women than men aged 20-59 in  urban areas. The
corresponding  deficit of females  in rural areas is about  355,000.
Figure 21 shows  these  patterns in a spatially  disaggregated  way. There are significantly  more males in the
rural areas of almost all voivods  in the economically  active age groups.  The reverse is true for females in
older working  age. These  patterns  reflect labor migration  of young women to urban areas. Sex ratios are
lowest in the traditional textile towns, while urban areas that have been dominated by heavy industry
show a more balanced  distribution.  In rural areas, in contrast,  men tend to stay to work in the agricultural
sector. According to  Weclawowicz (1996), these  dynamics have  serious  social  and  economic
consequences  as the shortage  of women in rural areas has lowered  marriage  rates and limits the creation
and sustainability  of family farms.
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There is some indication, that the large differences in sex ratios may be decreasing in the future. Figure 22
shows the sex ratio differentials between rural and urban areas for three years. In the younger adult age
cohorts, the sex ratio differential has been lower in 1998 than in the previous years. This is also reflected
in the maps shown previously in Figure 21, where the urban sex ratios for the 20-39 age group are more
balanced than those for the older working age group. We do not have any information, however, whether
these trends  reflect  changing social  attitudes  and  economic  preferences, or  whether  this  is  further
evidence of possible barriers to rural-urban migration that we have discussed elsewhere.
Figure 22: Trends in sex ratios, 1990-1998
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30  . .....  .............
25
20
S  $  . t  :  |  $  _  l  W  l  1~~~~~a  994
-5
0  1 45  -9 10- 15- 20- 25- 30- 35- 40- 45- 50- 55- 60- 65- 70+
14  19  24  29  34  39  44  49  54  59  64  69
34Declining  household  size
Poland is experiencing  similar demographic  trends as other countries in Europe (Council of Europe
1999).  Declining  birth rates will lead to an increasingly  older population  with a resulting reduction  in the
proportion  of population in working age. Official projections  for 2020, which were carried out in 1996,
show a moderate  increase of the total population to 40.7 million. However, there will be a significant
increase in the share of the so-called  immobile  working  age group (men aged 45-64  and women  aged 45-
59). The proportion  of retired  persons  will increase  from 13.7%  in 1995  to about 19%  in 2020.
Despite the relatively low growth of population  the number of households  will increase significantly  as
average household  size in Poland is likely to decrease  considerably.  Smaller families and the increasing
number  of single  households  are expected  to lead to an increase  of the total number of households  from
12.5 million in 1995  to 16 million in 2020. Demand  for housing is thus going to increase dramatically
over the next two decades.
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Katovvce Krakow.  Rzeszow
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Voivod codes used in the following charts
1 Warsaw  14 Katowice  27 Opole  40  Suwalki
2 Biala  Podlaska  15 Kielce  28 Ostroleka  41 Szczecin
3 Bialystok  16 Konin  29 Pila  42 Tarnobrzeg
4  Bielsko-Biala  17 Koszlain  30 Piotrkow  43 Tarnow
5 Bydgoszcz  18 Krakow  31 Plock  44 Torun
6  Chelm  19 Krosno  32 Poznan  45 Walbrzych
7 Ciechanow  20  Legnica  33 Przemysl  46 Wloclawek
8 Czestochowa  21 Leszno  34 Radom  47 Wroclaw
9  Elblag  22  Lublin  35 Rzeszow  48 Zamosc
10 Gdansk  23 Lomza  36 Siedlce  49 Zielona  Gora
11 Gorzow  24 Lodz  37 Sieradz
12 Jelenia  Gora  25 Nowy  Sacz  38 Skierniewice
13 Kalisz  26 Olsztyn  39  Slupsk
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